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Introduction
In June of 2011, at around eleven o'clock at night, police in Kandahar
City, Afghanistan arrested two twenty-three-year-old men.' Referred to as
Najib and Ahmad, they worked at a restaurant and were accused of feeding
the Taliban.2 They were taken to police headquarters and transferred to
the custody of men wearing the uniform of the Afghan Border Police
(ABP). 3 The policemen tied a scarf to Najib's handcuffs and hung him
from the ceiling.4 The officers then began to beat him with a metal baton
and a length of cable.5 After the beating, the police threw Ahmad and
Najib into the back of an armored Humvee, where they spent the night in
handcuffs. 6
t Barring any shenanigans, Nathanael Tenorio Miller intends to receive aJ.D. from
Cornell Law School in 2013. He would like to thank the ILJ staff for being generally
awesome; Professor Aziz F. Rana, Neal Christiansen, Nanay, Tatay, and Tita Laura for
making it all the way through the piece and providing critiques, advice, and comments;
all of the organizations and agencies that assisted with research; the phenomenally brave
journalists and aid workers who track this stuff; the rest of his family for helping with
the whole moral compass thing; and Zach, for providing a soundtrack. The Jimi
Hendrix Experience is suggested companion listening.
1. Matthieu Aikins, Our Man in Kandahar, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2011), http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/201 1/01/our-man-in-kandahar/8653/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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The next morning, the officers brought the two young men to the gov-
ernor's palace, which the United States military and the ABP jointly
guarded.7 Near the back of the palace was a room containing only a gas-
powered generator.8 The police forced Najib to lie on his back as they
attached wires to his toes.9 The police then asked Najib to "[t]ell [them]
the truth" and then switched on the generator. 10 After Najib passed out
from the pain, the police repeated the process with Ahmad."
Later that evening, the officers brought Najib and Ahmad to see the
commander of the Border Police, Abdul Raziq.12 Najib and Ahmad
explained to Raziq that they had merely been sending spare food from their
restaurant home with young boys so that the boys could feed their families.
Raziq then ordered Najib and Ahmad released.13
What happened to Najib and Ahmad was not an isolated incident, per-
petrated by individual soldiers or commanders.' 4 Instead, it is a symptom
of the wider failure of the Afghan government to address human rights
abuses within their armed forces. Three months after Najib and Ahmad's
arrest, Human Rights Watch released a report documenting killings, rapes,
arbitrary detentions, abductions, forcible land grabs, and illegal raids by
irregular armed groups and the Afghan Local Police (ALP).15
This incident also demonstrates the consequences of the United
States' circumventing its own laws to permit the distribution of military aid
and equipment to countries that violate their citizens' human rights. In
many instances, units receiving aid from the United States are responsible
for extra-judicial killings, torture, extortion, and rape.16 The failure of leg-
islation to prevent military aid from flowing to foreign military units
responsible for atrocities stems in part from a long-standing pattern in
which increasingly broad Executive power pushes back against legislative
attempts to limit Presidential authority in foreign policy decision-mak-
ing.' 7 Often, Congress legislates a foreign policy position and the Execu-
tive works around the intent, if not always the letter, of the law. Because of
subsequent congressional inaction, and a series of Supreme Court deci-
sions effectively depriving any potential party of means to sue for enforce-
ment of human rights legislation, the Executive remains in firm control.' 8
Without any independent check on its authority, the Executive's internal
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "JUST DON'T CALL IT A MILITIA": IMPUNITY, MILITIAS,
AND THE "AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE" 3 (2011).
15. See generally id.
16. See id. at 6.
17. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1258 (1988).
18. See id. at 1305.
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controls are insufficient to prevent funding units that have committed
human rights abuses.
This Executive control has very real consequences for people around
the globe. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, the Obama Administration requested
$12.8 billion for military aid to Afghanistan.' 9 In addition to Afghanistan,
in 2012 the United States plans to supply $3 billion in Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) to the government of Israel, 20 $1.3 billion to Egypt,21
$350 million to Pakistan,22 $44 million to Colombia,23 $20 million to
Indonesia,24 and $15 million to the Philippines.2 5 All of these govern-
ments are accused of widespread human rights violations.26 While it is
certainly not true that all beneficiaries of U.S. military aid commit human
rights violations, that distinction is likely lost on the civilians who suffer
the consequences.
In 1997, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced two laws, known as the
"Leahy Law" or the "Leahy Amendment," (the law), which he envisioned as
"an essential tool for protecting human rights."27 The Leahy Law places
conditions on the dissemination of U.S. military aid to countries accused
of human rights violations.28 Though the U.S. Department of State has
used the law to prevent some aid from being distributed to units in Colom-
bia, Indonesia, and Pakistan,29 this Note will show that the law's construc-
tion and inherent difficulties in policing military sales have rendered it
almost completely ineffective in preventing the human rights violations it
19. See OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., DEP'T OF DEF. BUDGET FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2012,
JUSTIFICATION FOR FY 2012 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AFGHANISTAN SECURITY
FORCES FUND (ASFF) 2 (2011).
20. See U.S. DEPT OF STATE, 2 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: FOREIGN OPERA-
TIONs FISCAL YEAR 2012 454, tbl. (2011) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF STATE].
21. See id.
22. See id. at 455, tbl.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 453, tbl.
25. See id.
26. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES COLOMBIA 1 (2011) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES COLOMBIA]; BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S.
DEPT OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES EGYPT 1 (2011);
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES INDONESIA 1 (2011); BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY,
HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES ISRAEL 3 (2011); BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES PAKISTAN 1 (2011);
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES PHILIPPINES 1 (2011) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES PHILIPPINES].
27. Human Rights, PATRICK LEAHY: U.S. SENATOR FOR VT., http://www.leahy.senate.
gov/issues/human-rights (last visited July 19, 2012).
28. See Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces, 22 U.S.C. § 2378d (2006);
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011, Pub. L.
No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011).
29. See Eric Schmitt & David E. Sanger, Pakistani Troops Linked to Abuses Will Lose
Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010), www.nytimes.com/2010/10/22/world/asia/22policy.
html?.
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was introduced to combat. Instead, the law succeeds in only partly dis-
tancing the United States from its allies' human rights abuses.
This Note accepts as part of its premise that the goals of the Leahy
Law-protecting people from human rights violations or, at the very least,
disassociating the United States from those human rights violations else-
where in the world-are valid. To illustrate how the Leahy Law fails to
achieve its goal, this Note outlines the procedure and mechanisms for U.S.
foreign military aid and the Leahy Law's enforcement mechanisms. Next,
it details Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Colombia as examples of
regimes whose militaries routinely commit human rights abuses as docu-
mented by the State Department and international non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs). It then outlines four factors that prevent the Leahy Law
from succeeding in preventing human rights violations: the statutory dis-
tinction between the two laws; the narrow definition of "unit"; the diffi-
culty in tracking aid; and the fact that arms, and to a lesser extent training,
are fungible commodities. This Note places the failure to enforce the Leahy
Law into a constitutional framework and on a continuum with other exam-
ples of Executive power pushing back against congressional regulation of
foreign policy, a pushback described in a 1988 article by Harold Koh.30
This Note concludes by suggesting that because judicial oversight and
enforcement are unlikely, in order to be effective the law must be re-written
to make larger segments of foreign militaries ineligible for funding or to
categorically deny funding to countries whose militaries have been accused
of human rights violations.
1. Background: Military Aid
The United States government distributes aid under a variety of aus-
pices. In general, foreign military financing (FMF) is the single largest
block of unclassified funding solely dedicated to military use appropriated
through the State Department. 3 ' FMF is used to finance foreign govern-
ments' purchase of U.S. military equipment and training: the Obama
Administration requested over $5.5 billion for FY 2012.32 Economic Sup-
port Funds (ESF), another aid mechanism, are grants designed to support
economic stability.33 They can be used for civilian purposes, but can also
be used to offset military expenditures.34 International Military Education
and Training (IMET) funds are for the education of military personnel on a
wide variety of topics from human rights to weapons systems.3 5 Non-
proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-mining and Related Activities (NADR)
30. See Koh, supra note 17, at 1258.
31. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 20, at 16.
32. See id.
33. Int'l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, A Citizen's Guide to Understanding
U.S. Foreign Military Aid, CENTER PUB. INTEGRITY (Aug. 12, 2011, 4:17 PM), http://
www.iwatchnews.org/2007/05/22/5772/citizen-s-guide-understanding-us-foreign-mili-
tary-aid.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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pays for de-mining, anti-terrorism, and nonproliferation training and assis-
tance. 36 The United States provides anti-narcotics funding through the
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement/Andean Counterdrug Initia-
tive (INCLE). Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) pays for peacekeeping oper-
ations around the world.3 7
In addition, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), which are sales from the
United States government to a foreign government, and Direct Commercial
Sales (DCS), which are overseas military sales by private U.S. companies,38
also support foreign militaries. These funds are not appropriations, and
therefore the Leahy Law does not cover them.39
In order to comply with congressional oversight when appropriating
foreign aid, the Administration makes annual requests to Congress for the
Security Assistance budget. 4 0 The request, known as a Congressional
Budget Justification (CBJ), itemizes expenditures by program and coun-
try.4 ' It is prepared by the Department of State in coordination with the
Department of Defense's (DOD) Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA). 4 2 Congress then reviews and votes on the CBJ.43
The U.S. intelligence community also administers classified pro-
grams.44 It is possible that these programs distribute large amounts of mil-
itary aid to governments and non-state actors, but because the budgets are
classified there is no systematic way for the public to track the funds.
Instead, oversight is limited to members of congressional intelligence
committees. 4 5
II. Background: The Leahy Law
Subsections (a) and (b) of § 2378d of Title 22 of the United States
Code state the following:
(a) In general. No assistance shall be furnished under this Act or the Arms
Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if
the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed
gross violations of human rights.
(b) Exception. The prohibition in subsection (a) shall not apply if the Secre-
tary determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See U.S. Arms Transfers: Government Data, FED'N AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.
org/programs/ssp/asmp/factsandfigures/government-data index.html (last visited June
6, 2012).
39. See Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 8058(c) 125 Stat. 38 (2011); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note
20.
40. Foreign Military Financing Program, DEF. SEC. COOPERATION AGENCY, http://www.
dsca.mil/home/foreign-.militaryjinancing-program.htm (last updated Nov. 15, 2010).
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Int'l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, supra note 33.
45. Id.
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Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives,
and the Committees on Appropriations that the government of such country
is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security
forces unit to justice.46
There is a corollary provision in the DOD Appropriations Act for 2011 that
reads as follows:
(a) None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to support any
training program involving a unit of the security forces or police of a foreign
country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible information from
the Department of State that the unit has committed a gross violation of
human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken.
(b) The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
shall ensure that prior to a decision to conduct any training program
referred to in subsection (a), full consideration is given to all credible infor-
mation available to the Department of State relating to human rights viola-
tions by foreign security forces.
(c) The Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State,
may waive the prohibition in subsection (a) if he determines that such
waiver is required by extraordinary circumstances.
(d) Not more than 15 days after the exercise of any waiver under subsection
(c), the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report to the congressional
defense committees describing the extraordinary circumstances, the pur-
pose and duration of the training program, the United States forces and the
foreign security forces involved in the training program, and the information
relating to human rights violations that necessitates the waiver.47
The Leahy Law applies to "foreign militaries, reserves, police, home-
land security forces such as border guards or customs police, prison
guards, and other units or individual members of units authorized to use
force."4 8 The State Department and the DOD have debated how to define
"unit."49 In a 1999 cable to all overseas embassies, the State Department
defined the unit receiving training as the unit to be vetted.50 Thus, if an
individual is to be trained, that individual is to be vetted. If a platoon is to
be trained, that platoon shall be vetted, rather than the brigade to which
the platoon belongs. In the same cable, the State Department stated that
"the vetting procedures should ascertain that no one against whom there
are credible allegations of gross violations of human rights is currently
assigned to the units in question."51 However, in a GAO report, State
Department officials did not believe that the vetting procedure required
46. Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces, 22 U.S.C. § 2378d (2006).
47. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011,
Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011).
48. U.S. Dep't of State, An Overview of the Leahy Vetting Process, HUMANRIGHTS.GOV
(May 14, 2012), http://www.humanrights.gov/2011/10/06/an-overview-of-the-leahy-
vetting-process/.
49. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-99-173, MIuTARY TRAINING:
MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF JOINT COMBINED ExCHANGE TRAINING 53 (1999).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 53-54.
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screening every individual. 52 After some discussion, the State Department
determined that "vetting of every individual in a unit would be warranted if
information received would merit a further review of the unit in ques-
tion."53 Often investigators identify the sub-unit, which is generally a bat-
talion or similarly sized unit.54
The vetting process begins with the appropriate U.S. embassy running
a preliminary search on the unit or individual that is slated to receive mili-
tary aid, using Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights,
U.S. government agency records including consular records and embassy
files and databases, NGO human rights reports, and media articles.55
Embassies may also choose to undertake checks with local police and gov-
ernment, as well as interview individual victims.5 6 Once the investigation
in the home country is complete, the State Department's Bureau of Democ-
racy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) in Washington, as well as regional
bureaus, run further investigations.57 If there is need for further review,
the DRL can create a team to investigate the issue.58
Derogatory information is reviewed case-by-case under a multi-factor
totality of the circumstances test.59 Credible evidence need not meet the
same standard as admissible evidence in a U.S. court. 60 Among factors to
be considered are the source, the details available, the applicability to the
individual or unit, the circumstances in the relevant country, and the avail-
ability of corroborating information. 61
Both appropriations bills also include a waiver provision. 62 The Secre-
tary of Defense may waive the Leahy Law contained in the Defense Appro-
priations Bill if there are "extraordinary circumstances,"63 and the
Secretary of State may waive the law if they find that the government of the
recipient country is taking "effective measures" to bring the perpetrators of
human rights violations to justice.64 In 2005, Secretary of State Con-
doleezza Rice used a waiver to permit FMF to Indonesia. 65 In contrast to
52. See id.
53. Letter from Bert T. Edwards, Chief Fin. Officer, U.S. Dep't of State, to Henry L.
Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller Gen., Nat'l Sec. & Int'l Affairs, U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office (June 28, 1999), in U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 49, at 66.
54. Letter from Arturo A. Valenzuela, Assistant Sec'y of State, Bureau of W. Hemi-
sphere Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State (Jan. 26, 2011) (on file with author).
55. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 48.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces, 22 U.S.C. § 2378d (2006);
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011, Pub. L.
No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011).
63. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub.
L. No. 112-10, § 8058(c) 125 Stat. 38 (2011).
64. Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces, 22 U.S.C. § 2378d (2012).
65. Charles "Ken" Comer, Leahy in Indonesia: Damned if You Do (and Even if You
Don't), 37 AsuN AFF.: AN Am. REv. 53, 60 (2010).
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the techniques for avoiding the Leahy Law described below, there was sig-
nificant political opposition to Indonesia's waiver. 66
III. The Effectiveness of the Leahy Law in Afghanistan
In early October of 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan.67
Several weeks later, Taliban soldiers fled Kabul. 68 Before the end of the
year, the United States began the long process of developing, stabilizing,
and strengthening the Afghan economic, social, and political environ-
ment.69 Security in Afghanistan has remained elusive, with a United
Nations report stating that between 2006 and 2010, 8,832 civilians were
killed, with civilian deaths increasing each year.70 As of mid-2012, 3,091
NATO soldiers had been killed.7
Between 2001 and 2010, Congress appropriated nearly $52 billion for
assistance to Afghanistan.72 Of this sum, 56% has gone to the Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund (ASFF)-the account supporting the training and
equipping of Afghan security forces, which the DOD monitors and con-
trols.73 In FY 2010, U.S. appropriations for Afghan aid were over $14.6
billion.74 About 63% of that was slated to go to security programs,75 with
over $9 billion managed by the ASFF. 76 In the past two years that number
has increased. For FY 2011, the ASFF outlay was $11.2 billion and for FY
2012, the DOD has the authority to spend $12.8 billion on the ASFF. 77
Prior to the establishment of the ASFF, FMF provided $1 billion in military
aid.78
In contrast, the Department of State controls relatively few of the
resources flowing from the United States to Afghanistan. In FY 2010,
Afghanistan received approximately $2.8 billion in aid from the Depart-
66. See Glenn Kessler, Military Ties to Indonesia Resume Too Soon for Some, WASH.
POST (Nov. 23, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/
1 1/22/AR200511220175 1.html (noting Senator Leahy's opposition to the waiver).
67. See, e.g., Patrick Wintour et al., It's Time for War, Bush and Blair Tell Taliban,
OBSERVER (Oct. 7, 2001, 2:13 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/07/
politics.september11.
68. See, e.g., David Rohde & Dexter Filkins, A Nation Challenged: Combat; Taliban
Withdrawing from Kabul as Rebels Move Toward Capital, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/13/world/nation-challenged-combat-taliban-with-
drawing-kabul-rebels-move-toward-capital.html?scp=9&sq=captured+kabul&st=nyt.
69. See CURT TARNOFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AFGHANISTAN: U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
2 (2010).
70. See U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION IN AFG. & AFG. INDEP. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N,
AFGHANISTAN ANNUAL REPORT 2010: PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT i
(2011).
71. See Coalition Military Fatalities By Year, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, http://
icasualties.org/oef/ (last visited July 18, 2012).
72. TARNOFF, supra note 69, at Summ.
73. See id. at 2.
74. Id. at 12, tbl.1.
75. Id. at 2.
76. OFFICE OF THE SEC Y OF DEF., supra note 19, at 2.
77. Id.
78. TARNOFF, supra note 69, at 10.
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ment of State; 7 9 in FY 2012, Afghanistan was slated to receive close to $2
billion from the Department of State.80 The large majority of the FY 2012
Department of State funds designated for Afghanistan, almost $1.6 billion,
were earmarked as Economic Support Funds.8 '
This aid does not always end up benefiting the Afghans. The United
States is currently training and arming two organizations, the ALP and the
ABP,8 2 both of which have been accused of human rights abuses. 83
General David Petreaus, then the commander of the International
Security Assistance Force, introduced the ALP program as part of a wider
strategy to lower NATO troop levels.8 4 As of August 2011, the Afghan gov-
ernment had recruited 7,000 men into the ALP.8 5 By 2012, the DOD
expected to increase the ALP to 30,000 men.8 6 The ALP does not have a
mandate to investigate crimes or arrest suspects.87 Instead, the ALP is
designed to "'secure local communities and prevent rural areas from infil-
tration of insurgent groups"' 8 and "improve security and stability at the
district and local level."8 9 A military official told the British Guardian
newspaper that President Hamid Karzai had opposed the ALP program,
but had it "forced down his throat like a foie gras goose."90
The closest Afghan word for militias is arbakai.9 1 For several decades,
local armed groups have subjected Afghans to serious human rights
abuses. These groups include the following: non-military, armed men
working for tribal leaders; criminal gangs; ideologically driven insurgents;
and private security companies. They have participated in murder, beat-
ings, extortion, and rape.92 While the ALP program was created with the
best of intentions, many Afghans find it difficult to distinguish the ALP
from the arbakai.93
This stems from various violent occurrences around Afghanistan
involving the ALP. For example, in October 2010, an ALP member was
79. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 20, at 440, tbl.2a.
80. Id. at 455, tbl.
81. U.S. DEPT OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
SUMMARY TABLES FISCAL YEAR 2012 26, tbl.3 (2011).
82. See OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., supra note 19, at 72.
83. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 3; Aikins, supra note 1.
84. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 4; Jeremy Kelly, US-Backed Afghan
Militias Accused of Human Rights Abuses, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2011, 3:53 AM), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 1/sep/12/us-backed-afghan-militias-abuses?INTCMP=
SRCH (discussing the introduction of the ALP).
85. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 4.
86. See OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., supra note 19, at 55.
87. See AFGHAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, ADVISOR GUIDE 1-7 (2011).
88. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 53 (citing Sayed Salahuddin, Karzai
Approves Plan for New Afghan Police Force, REUTERS (July 15, 2010, 6:22 AM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/15/us-afghanistan-force-idUSTRE66E18X2010
0715).
89. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., supra note 19, at 82.
90. Kelly, supra note 84.
91. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 1.
92. See id. at 2.
93. Id. at 3.
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accused of murdering two men in Bakhtabad village.94 During a raid in
February of 2011, an ALP unit in Shindand stole belongings, beat
residents, and illegally detained six men.95 In June of 2011, the ALP
detained and beat two boys.96 One of the boys had nails hammered into
his feet.97 In Baghlan province, the U.S. military recruited local strongman
Nur-ul Haq and his men into the ALP; in August of 2010, while on patrol
with U.S. soldiers, Haq and his men unjustifiably killed a nine-year-old
boy.98 In April of 2011, four Baghlan ALP members kidnapped a thirteen-
year-old boy, took him to the house of an ALP sub-commander, and gang-
raped him.99
Afghan authorities have been unable to prosecute the ALP members.
In Baghlan, the police have been unable to even question ALP members
because of their relationship with U.S. forces.100 In Bakhtabad, the police
told family members of one victim that they could do nothing due to
United States' backing of the ALP. When the family went to the U.S.
troops, the soldiers informed the family that it was an Afghan police mat-
ter.101 Situations like these have contributed to an impression amongst
Afghanis that ALP members can act with impunity.102 The district gover-
nor of Khanabad, Nizamuddin Nashir, said that he could do nothing to
check the power of the arbakai. As he told Human Rights Watch, "Itihey
collect ushr [informal tax], take the daughters of people, they do things
against the wives of the people, they take their horses, sheep, anything."103
The ALP is managed by the Afghan Ministry of Interior and is under
the authority of a given district's chief of police.104 The chief of police
oversees the ALP training, validation process, and member screening. 05
ALP members are nominated by the local council, known as shura, and
vetted by the Afghan intelligence service.106 Despite Afghan oversight, the
United States trains and provides technical assistance to the ALP units.' 0 7
For FY 2012, the DOD has requested $25 million in order to arm the ALP
with 20,000 AK-47s,10s $1.875 million for radios,109 $30 million for 1,200
pickup trucks,110 and $5.2 million for compasses, binoculars, global posi-
94. Id. at 6.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 6.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 32.
104. DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANI-
STAN AND UNITED STATES PLAN FOR SUSTAINING THE AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY
FORCES 62 (2011).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., supra note 19, at 59.
109. Id. at 60.
110. Id. at 57.
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tioning systems, tow straps, jumper cables, weapons mounts, and other
items for ALP sites.' This is in addition to the $1 billion for armored
vehicles,112 $62 million for ammunition,113 $35 million for medical equip-
ment,1" 4 $491 million for pay," 5 and $1.9 billion for sustainment1 6 that
are shared between the various departments of the Afghan National Police
(ANP), of which the ALP is a part. The U.S. military has also tasked a
conventional U.S. Army infantry battalion, 1-16 Infantry, to rapidly
expand the ALP program, despite the alleged human rights violations.117
The ALP is not the only division within the ANP that has been widely
accused of committing human rights violations. The Atlantic has docu-
mented a series of human rights abuses thought to be committed by
Afghan General Abdul Raziq, acting chief of police in Kandahar City and a
commander of the ABP.118
The ABP mandate is to perform border control and customs functions
up to fifty kilometers from the Afghan border, as well as control the entry
and exit of individuals and vehicles at international airports." 9 While it
not fully funded by the ASFF in the same way the ALP is, the ABP enjoys a
great deal of U.S. support.120 For FY 2012, the DOD has requested over
$1.1 billion for the training of the ANP, including the ABP.121 In addition,
two private military firms, DynCorp and Xe, formerly Blackwater, trained
Raziq's men, whose salaries are paid through the Law and Order Trust
Fund for Afghanistan, a UN-administered fund to which the United States
is the largest contributor.122
The Atlantic linked Raziq to a series of massacres. On March 20,
2006, sixteen men, including a smuggler named Shin Noorzai, were in
Kabul when a friend of one of the men invited them to a house and prom-
ised them music and entertainment.123 The sixteen men were then
drugged, bound, gagged, and loaded into government vehicles, including a
green Ford Ranger displaying the seal of the Border Police.124 The men
were then brought to Spin Boldak, where Abdul Raziq, then a Border Police
colonel, was based.' 25 The men were all shot at close range by men under
Raziq's command.1 26
111. Id. at 64.
112. Id. at 58.
113. Id. at 78.
114. Id. at 76.
115. Id. at 77.
116. Id. at 72.
117. See DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 104, at 63.
118. See Aikins, supra note 1.
119. AFGHAN MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, supra note 87, at 1-5.
120. See OFFICE OF THE SEC'Y OF DEF., supra note 19, at 65, 72 (reporting the financial
support the United States provides the Afghan National Police).
121. Id. at 65.
122. Aikins, supra note 1.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Shin's tribe had been feuding with Raziq's tribe over smuggling routes, and
Raziq held Shin responsible for the 2004 killing of Raziq's brother. The colonel loaded
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The State Department was aware of this claim against Raziq. In its
2006 report on human rights in Afghanistan, the State Department
described the incident:
In March Commander Abdul Razaq of Kandahar province was removed from
his post for allegedly attacking 16 rivals under the pretext that they were
Taliban militants. The 16 men were Pakistani citizens who had traveled to
Afghanistan for Afghan New Year celebrations. They belonged to a clan in
Pakistan that Razaq blamed for the death of his brother two years earlier.' 27
Nor is this the only time that Raziq's actions have been in the State Depart-
ment's reports on human rights. The 2010 report contained another simi-
lar claim:
[On February 6, Shamshad TV and Radio Azadi reported that Afghan Bor-
der Police mistakenly killed seven civilians who were collecting firewood
near a checkpoint in the border town of Spin Boldak, Kandahar Province.
the men into a convoy and headed out to a deserted stretch of the Afghan-Pakistani
border. There, Raziq and his men unloaded their captives and shot all sixteen at close
range with automatic weapons. Shin was the target; the other fifteen were collateral
damage.
Upon his return to Spin Boldak, Raziq reported that he had intercepted Taliban fight-
ers trying to cross the border from Pakistan and that he and his men had killed at least
fifteen Taliban in a gun battle. Raziq told the Associated Press, "We got a tip-off about
them coming across the border. We went down there and fought them."
An Afghan official working for the European Union in Spin Boldak was suspicious.
He called his supervisor, Michael Semple, who contacted a senior official at the Afghan
Interior Ministry. The senior Afghani official was able to send a team from the Criminal
Investigations Department (CID) to Spin Boldak.
The day after the killing, the CID team arrived in Spin Boldak and quickly discovered
that the bodies were still at the border and that the story of the battle was untrue. The
men's wounds were inflicted at close range, the victims were clumped together at the
bottom of a gully, their wrists showed signs of having been bound, and their clothes
were clean and new. One of the CID members said that when "we asked the local police
what happened .. . they said that Abdul Raziq came in five or six vehicles, and then they
heard firing." Raziq refused to meet with the CID team.
The CID team reported their findings upon their return. Major General Abdur
Rahman, then the deputy director of the Border Police, led a larger investigation. Sem-
ple, deputy to Francesc Vendrell, the European Union (EU)'s special representative to
Afghanistan, was briefed on the case. He said, "Itihey documented the killings in such a
way that would leave no reasonable person in doubt that these were summary execu-
tions carried out by the Border Police." Yet no prosecution was ever initiated. Rahman
later gave an interview to an Afghan TV station where he supported Raziq's version of
the story.
Vendrell raised the issue of the killings with President Karzai. Karzai implied that
Raziq "was an essential ally against whom he [Karzai] was not prepared to take action,
irrespective of the nature of the allegations or the evidence." Vendrell was shocked. One
of his tasks was to ensure there were no gross violations of human rights. He reported
the incident to his headquarters in Brussels, where it was passed on to all EU govern-
ments. Id.
127. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2006
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: AFGHANISTAN (2007), available at http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78868.htm.
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Reports stated that the police officials involved in the shooting were taken
into custody for interrogation.1 28
The United States' response to the accusations against Raziq has been
to continue its support, even suggesting that the United States provide a
team to help assist Raziq with public relations. A leaked cable from the
embassy in Kabul outlined the plan:
SCR [United States Senior Civilian Representative] suggested that a team of
experts from Regional Platform-South (RP-S) and RC-S [Regional Command-
South] come to Spin Boldak to help craft a media plan around the clean-up
of the border, once a comprehensive anti-corruption initiative is in place.
(Note: A proposed RP-S drafted Information Operations campaign includes
short-term steps to do local radio spots announcing changes at the border,
the setting up of billboards advertising the customs fees, and, if credible, the
longer-term encouragement of stories in the international media on the
"reform" of Razziq, the so-called "Master of Spin." End Note.) Razziq said he
would welcome such a team.129
These are just a few of the human rights abuses that NGOs,13 0 jour-
nalists,13 1 and the State Department' 3 2 have documented in Afghanistan.
With NATO forces increasingly relying upon the ALP and ABP to establish
security, the human rights climate seems to be getting worse, not better.' 3 3
The experience in Afghanistan demonstrates how difficult it is to avoid
arming units that have committed human rights violations and how dire
the consequences can be when the United States provides training, weap-
ons, and materials to the wrong people.
IV. The Effectiveness of the Leahy Law in the Philippines
From the end of World War II until the early 1990s, the United States
operated several major military facilities in the Philippines.134 Since 2002,
despite constant pressure to reassign the soldiers to Afghanistan or Iraq,
six hundred elite U.S. soldiers have been deployed to the Joint Special
Operations Task Force-Philippines.13 5 These Army Special Forces, known
128. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: AFGHANISTAN 2 (2011), available at http:/
/www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/sca/154477.htm.
129. Cable from Embassy Kabul to United States Sec'y of State, 10KABUL589, Kanda-
har: Corruption Reforms By the Master of Spin, Media Campaign 1 4 (Feb. 17, 2010)
(emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., OXFAM ET AL., No TIME TO LOSE: PROMOTING THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE
AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES 2 (2011).
131. See, e.g., Aikins, supra note 1.
132. See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
supra note 128.
133. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 14, at 1-2.
134. See generally BUREAU OF E. ASIAN & PAC. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BACK-
GROUND NOTE: PHILIPPINES (2012).
135. See, e.g., Thom Shanker, U.S. Military to Stay in Philippines, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2009, at Al0; US Plays Quiet Role in the Philippines, BBC NEWS (Mar. 28, 2008, 4:51 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7316761.stm.
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as Green Berets, have been training Filipino forces and providing logistical
and intelligence support.1 3 6
Despite the presence of U.S. forces, the State Department's 2011
report on human rights in the Philippines was highly critical of the Philip-
pine government.' 3 7 The second paragraph of the report said the
following:
Arbitrary, unlawful, and extrajudicial killings by elements of the security
services and political killings, including killings of journalists, by a variety
of state and non-state actors continued to be serious problems. Concerns
about impunity persisted. Members of the security services physically and
psychologically abused suspects and detainees, and there were instances of
torture. Pretrial detainees and convicts were often held in overcrowded, sub-
standard conditions. Disappearances occurred, and arbitrary or warrantless
arrests and detentions were common. Trials were delayed, and procedures
were prolonged. Corruption was endemic. Leftist and human rights activ-
ists reported harassment by local security forces. Problems such as violence
against women, abuse of children, child sexual exploitation, trafficking in
persons, child labor, and ineffective enforcement of worker rights were
common.13 8
The State Department's report further outlined a number of other
human rights violations that had occurred in the Philippines. In 2010, the
Philippine Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an independent govern-
ment agency, investigated fifty-three new complaints of politically moti-
vated killings involving sixty-seven victims.' 3 9 The CHR suspected that
some of the leftist activists killed were the targets of personnel from the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP).14 0 The PNP task force responsible for monitoring extrajudicial kill-
ings had recorded 161 killings since 2001.141 Of these 161 cases, 99 were
filed in court and prosecutors' offices, 61 were under investigation, and 1
was closed.' 4 2 During 2010, there was not a single conviction of a state
actor.143
The human rights abuses are not limited to extra-judicial killings. The
CHR found that PNP and AFP forces were implicated in five of ten disap-
pearance cases in 2010.144 During that year there were no developments
in earlier disappearance cases. The State Department report stated,
"[i]nvestigative and judicial inaction on previous cases of disappearance
contributed to a climate of impunity .... "14 The State Department identi-
fied Philippine police, military, and law enforcement officers as suspects in
136. See SHANKER, supra note 135.
137. See HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES PHILIPPINES, supra note 26, at 1.
138. Id. at 1.
139. Id. at 2.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 3.
145. Id. at 4.
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twenty-two cases of alleged torture involving ninety-three victims.'4 6
The U.S. government has been concerned with the AFP and the PNP
for several years. In 2005, the U.S. embassy in Manila dispatched a cable
describing the situation:
The PNP management is a mess. Few PNP officials would even try to deny
this reality . . . . [D]aily exposure to corrupt, inefficient, or badly managed
police officials is a cancer upon the body politic. Systemic flaws need insti-
tutional reforms . . .. In the absence of such systemic PNP reform, popular
impatience for better police performance and management-exacerbated by
the belief that nearly everyone in the PNP is corrupt-may also encourage
more public support for elected officials, such as the mayors of Davao and
Cebu, who have openly supported the use of extra-judicial killings, coordi-
nated in concert with local police forces under their control, as a means of
controlling crime . . .. Such an outcome would be disastrous to the human
rights climate in this treaty ally and democratic partner, and would also
undermine or harm progress on major USG goals here to combat terrorism,
narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, and other transnational
problems.147
Two years later, in 2007, Keith Luse, a senior congressional staff mem-
ber, had a series of meetings with Philippine government officials, embassy
staff, and NGOs.s4 8 While meeting with senior Philippine officials, Luse
conveyed "serious Congressional concern about extrajudicial killings and
explained that his trip was essentially a fact-finding visit to learn first-hand
about the issue."14 9 In response, the Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs Undersecretary cited a number of steps the Philippine government
had taken and stressed that the New People's Army (NPA), the armed wing
of the Communist Party of the Philippines, had conducted many of the
killings in a purge.o5 0 The Philippine National Deputy Security Adviser's
explanation echoed the Undersecretary's comment, adding that, "to the
extent the Philippine military was involved, it was 'rogue elements' within
.151it . . . .15
In his comments, the Security Adviser cited the Melo Commission, an
investigation into extrajudicial killings that President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo started in 2006. The report offered a qualified critique of the mili-
tary, dismissing the idea that the extrajudicial killings were part of an inter-
nal NPA purge.1 5 2
Much of the Melo report centered on General Jovito Palparan, now
both a Filipino Congressman and a fugitive.' 5 3 Between February and
146. Id.
147. Cable from Embassy Manila, 05MANILA1506 Law Enforcement Corruption in
the Philippines, 117 (Mar. 1, 2005).
148. Cable from Embassy Manila, 07MANILA2931 Staffdel Luse Visit to the Philip-
pines, 1 (Aug. 29, 2007).
149. Id. 5.
150. Id.
151. Id. 9 6.
152. See JOSE A. R. MELO ET AL., INDEPENDENT COMMISSION To ADDRESS MEDIA AND
ACTIVIST KILLINGS 55 (2007).
153. See id. at 56-61.
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August of 2005, Palparan commanded the 8th Infantry Division in the
Eastern Visayas, and between September 2005 and September 2006 he
commanded the 7th Infantry Division in Central Luzon. 154 Activists
nicknamed Palparan "Berdugo," or "Butcher."1 55 While the Melo report
was unable to arrive at definite conclusion, it was highly critical of
Palparan:
The rise in killings somehow became more pronounced in areas where Gen-
eral Palparan was assigned. The trend was so unusual that General Palparan
was said to have left a trail of blood or bodies in his wake wherever he was
assigned. He "earned" the moniker "Berdugo" from activist and media
groups for his reputation. General Palparan ascribes his grisly reputation to
his enemies, as part of their propaganda campaign to discredit him and to
denigrate his excellent performance in implementing the various missions
and programs assigned to him by his superiors.
General Palparan, clearly the man in the center of the maelstrom, admits to
having uttered statements openly encouraging persons to perform extrajudi-
cial killings against those suspected of being communists, albeit unarmed
civilians. Worse, he was reported to have "expressed delight" at the disap-
pearance of at least two persons, mere students, but who were suspected of
being communist or activists.1 56
On May 4, 2011, mothers of two missing University of the Philippines
students filed a criminal case against Palparan.157 The case alleges that the
General and several of his officers were guilty of rape, causing serious
physical injuries, arbitrary detention, and maltreatment of prisoners.158
The complaint cites a farmer who was also abducted and has since testified
in court.' 5 9 The witness says that he saw several men torturing the stu-
dents. 160 As of January 2012, Philippine authorities were still searching
for Palparan,161 and there is a 1 million peso (approximately $23,100)
reward for his capture.162
While Palparan commanded the 7th Infantry Division, the United
States trained soldiers under his command on at least six different occa-
sions.163 This was despite the fact that the U.S. embassy in Manila knew of
the accusations of human rights violations. In a cable entitled "Left-Wing
154. Id. at 21.
155. See Palparan and His Men Must Face a Swift Trial Towards Imprisonment,
KARAPATAN (Aug. 7, 2011, 12:44 PM), http://www.karapatan.org/node/435.
156. MELO ET AL., supra note 152, at 56-57 (emphasis added).
157. KARAPATAN, supra note 155.
158. Id.
159. See What Went Before: Abduction of UP Students Karen Emperto and Sherlyn
Cadapan, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER (Dec. 17, 2011, 2:48 AM), http://newsinfo.inquirer.
net/112599/what-went-before-abduction-of-up-students-karen-empeno-and-sherlyn-
cadapan.
160. See id.; see also KARAPATAN, supra note 155.
161. See Palparan Bounty Raised to P1 Million, SUN STAR (Jan. 5, 2012), http://
www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/local-news/2012/01/05/palparan-bounty-raised-pl-mil-
lion-198984.
162. Id.
163. See BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRs, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN MILITARY
TRAINING: JOINT REPORT TO CONGRESS, FIscAL YEARS 2006 AND 2007 (2007).
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Activists Remain a Target in the Philippines," the embassy discussed and
dismissed the accusations against Palparan, saying:
Leftist organizations continue to blame elements of the GRP, especially the
police and the AFP, for carrying out the attacks. Increasingly, critics are
pointing to Major General Jovito Palparan Jr., the commander of the 7th
Infantry Division in Central Luzon, who has been accused of human rights
abuses in the past (though such allegations have never been proven).
Palparan, who was recently awarded the Philippine Distinguished Service
Star for meritorious actions as a division commander in Luzon and Samar,
has dismissed allegations linking him to any extra-judicial killings, stating,
"Those are all just propaganda to destroy the image of the government." The
AFP has challenged leftist groups to go to court to prove their allegations. 164
In 2009, in response to unprosecuted extra-judicial killings, the U.S.
House of Representatives passed a resolution withholding $2 million of the
$30 million requested for FMF to the Philippines for FY 2010.165 The
House tied the money to efforts to prosecute those suspected of extra-judi-
cial killings.16 6 The Obama Administration then lobbied Congress to get
the restrictions removed. 16 7 Eventually, FY 2010 saw $29 million in FMF
disbursed to the Philippines. 168 In FY 2012, the State Department CBJ has
requested $15 million for FMF to the Philippines.169
The funding requests for the Philippines demonstrate the relative
inability of Congress to exert its political will, even when the amount of
funding is relatively low. Moreover, the Philippines, a former U.S. colony
that has maintained strong military ties to the United States, still suffers
from human rights abuses. This indicates that joint training exercises and
close cooperation between the U.S. and Philippine militaries are, on their
own, not enough to stem human rights abuses.
V. The Effectiveness of the Leahy Law in Colombia
Like the Philippines, Colombia has a long history of U.S. military
involvement, and U.S. military aid increased dramatically after 2001.170
Unlike the Philippines, the majority of funding for Colombia is funneled
through the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement/Andean
Counterdrug Initiative (INCLE).171 For FY 2012, the Obama Administra-
tion requested $160 million for INCLE and $44 million for FMF.17 2 Up
164. Cable from Embassy Manila to U.S. Sec'y of State, 06MAN1LA1452 Left-Wing
Activists Remain a Target in the Philippines, The Blame Game 1 3 (Mar. 3, 2006).
165. See Pia Lee-Brago et al., Obama Asks US Congress to Remove Conditions on Mili-
tary Aid, PHILIPPINE STAR (Nov. 10, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.philstar.com/
Article.aspx?articleld=522045&publica.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 20, at 445, tbl.2b.
169. Id. at 453, tbl.
170. See FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION & U.S. OFFICE ON COLOMBIA, MILITARY ASSIs-
TANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COLOMBIA, U.S. ACCOUNTABILITY, AND GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS 3
(2010).
171. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 20, at 455.
172. See id.
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until at least 2009, the State Department published a report on the end-use
of the funds provided through INCLE.1 73 As for the remainder of the fund-
ing, since at least 2011, lists of units vetted for compliance with the Leahy
Law are "classified to protect the operational capacity of Colombian mili-
tary units." 74
Also like the Philippines, NGOs and the State Department have
accused the Colombian military of committing a myriad of human rights
violations.' 75 In its 2011 report on Colombia, the State Department said
that "[plolitical and unlawful killings remained an extremely serious prob-
lem, and there were some reports that members of the security forces com-
mitted extrajudicial killings . . . ."176 A July 2010 report by the Fellowship
of Reconciliation (FOR) reported "alarming links between Colombian mili-
tary units that receive U.S. assistance and civilian killings committed by
the army."1 77
The FOR study, "Military Assistance and Human Rights," was thor-
ough and damning.178 Over a period of two years, the FOR examined
more than three thousand extra-judicial killings and the roughly five hun-
dred Colombian military units receiving U.S. military aid and training.179
In 2007, twenty-three out of twenty-five brigade jurisdictions were accused
of extra-judicial killings.' 80 One hundred forty-two reported killings have
been directly attributed to fourteen different mobile brigades, eleven of
which were vetted to receive assistance.181 Of the 3,014 killings reviewed
by the FOR, more than 1,500 were under investigation by the Colombian
Attorney General's office, but only 43 had reached a verdict.182 On aver-
age, the FOR report found that "extrajudicial killings increased on average
in areas after the United States increased assistance to units in those
areas."18 3 In the sixteen largest jurisdictions where military aid was
increased, the number of reported executions averaged an increase of
56%.184 The inverse was also true: in years when the United States most
reduced the military assistance to a region, the number of reported execu-
tions fell by 56%.185 Even after November 2008, where the number of
reported military extra-judicial killings dropped significantly because of
institutional practices designed to reduce the frequency of murder by the
173. See Reports, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rpt/index.htm
(last visited July 18, 2012) (providing internet links to end-use monitoring reports from
2001 to 2009).
174. Valenzuela, supra note 54.
175. See FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION, supra note 170; HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
COLOMBIA, supra note 26.
176. HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES COLOMBIA, supra note 26, at 2.
177. FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION, supra note 170, at iii.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 7.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 8.
183. Id. at 101.
184. See id. at 10-11.
185. See id.
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military, the drop was accompanied by a steep climb in the number of
reported civilian killings by paramilitary groups.18 6 While there are sev-
eral explanations for these increases, including higher levels of violence in
some areas than others, 18 7 an increased number of soldiers in assisted
units, changes in population in jurisdiction of assigned units, possible dif-
ferences in reporting killings by assisted units, and differing attitudes of
U.S. officials,"' the data suggests an almost categorical failure of the
Leahy Law in Colombia.
Another source of conflict between the human rights goals of the
Leahy Law and foreign military training is the Western Hemisphere Insti-
tute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), formerly known as the School
of the Americas (SOA). Since its establishment in 1946, WHINSEC-SOA
has trained over 60,000 members of Central and South American armed
forces, 189 including over 9,500 Colombian soldiers.190 Colombia holds
over 60% of the seats available for students at WHINSEC-SOA.191 Some
of these troops are alleged to have forced children to march in front of
military columns to detonate landmines or spring ambushes.192 The
Colombian soldiers have also been accused of mass-murder, disappear-
ances, torture, and extrajudicial killings, including that of Archbishop Isa-
ias Duarte.-93 In addition to Colombia, soldiers trained at the SOA have
committed human rights violations in Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, and Paraguay.194
Many of these human rights abuses were part of the SOA's curricu-
lum. In 1996, the Pentagon admitted that seven training manuals used at
the SOA were designed to advocate the systemic use of torture, blackmail,
and executions to neutralize dissidents.195 The manuals identified poten-
tial targets as "'religious workers, labor organizers, student groups and
others in sympathy with the cause of the poor."' 96
In 2000, the House of Representatives narrowly voted down an
attempt to close the SOA.197 Instead, the SOA was renamed WHINSEC.198
In 2007, WHINSEC survived another vote to close the school by six votes
in the House of Representatives.1 99 A month before the vote, Salvatore
186. See id. at iv.
187. See id. at 13.
188. See id. at 14.
189. See Bill Quigley, The Case for Closing the School of the Americas, 20 BYU J. Pus. L.
1, 3 (2005).
190. See id. at 11.
191. See Colombian Paramilitary Confirms Collusion with SOA/WHINSEC Graduates,
SOA WATCH, http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/victims-and-survivors/colom-
bia/1541 (last visited July 18, 2012).
192. See Quigley, supra note 189, at 11.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 5.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 6.
198. See id.
199. See Eliana Monteforte, WHINSEC Remains Open: Congress Narrowly Fails to Halt
Funding the Former School of the Americas, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, (July 6,
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Mancuso, the former commander of the paramilitary organization United
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, testified in a closed hearing in Medellin,
Colombia.200 In his testimony, he said that he and other paramilitaries,
which the U.S. State Department labeled "foreign terrorist organizations,"
were a creation of state policy and collaborated with Colombian military
and government officials who had been trained and served as instructors
at WHINSEC-SOA. 2 0 1
The FOR posits two reasons for the failure of the Leahy Law in Colom-
bia: the first is the inadequate information and a difference in bureaucratic
priorities between the State Department, which had knowledge of human
rights abuse; and the second is the other branches of the Executive, which
prioritized arming Colombian allies. 202 While both reasons are plausible,
the relatively high levels of human rights abuse documentation in Colom-
bia and the relatively low threshold of "credible information" suggests that
the latter, rather than the former, is more likely.
VI. Lessons to be Learned from Afghanistan, the Philippines, and
Colombia
In practice, the Leahy Law is too easy to circumvent. If the Executive
wished to finance military units that have committed human rights viola-
tions, it could fund the unit through covert operations or waive the Leahy
Law. In addition, even if the law is not disobeyed outright, there are at
least four factors that prevent the Leahy Law from effectively deterring
human rights violations.
The first factor is the statutory distinction between the Foreign Aid
and Defense Appropriations bills. The key difference between the two
pieces of legislation is that the Leahy Law text within the Foreign Aid provi-
sion bans training and arms, whereas the Defense Appropriations Bill bans
only training.203 The $12.8 billion for the ASFF, appropriated through the
Defense Appropriations Bill, is free of any restriction on the purchase of
weapons for units that have committed human rights violations. Even if
dedicated and competent diplomats carefully enforce the letter of the law,
if the Executive wishes to arm human rights violators, all it has to do is
appropriate the funds through the DOD rather than the State Department.
This is precisely what is happening in Afghanistan. Even if it were shown
that all $62 million worth of ammunition was distributed to torturers and
extortionists, it still would not violate the Leahy Law.
The second factor that prevents the Leahy Law from being an effective
deterrent is the narrow definition of a "unit." Particularly when combined
2007), http://www.coha.org/whinsec-remains-open-congress-narrowly-fails-to-halt-fund-
ing-the-former-school-of-the-americas/.
200. See SOA WATCH, supra note 191.
201. Id.
202. See FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION, supra note 170, at 15-16.
203. Compare Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38 (2011), with Limitation on Assistance to Security
Forces, 22 U.S.C. § 2378d (2006).
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with the next two factors, the difficulty in tracking aid and the fungible
nature of arms and training, defining a unit as an individual limits the
law's ability to prevent larger units from receiving funding. In order to
receive military aid, a foreign commander could keep some people and
units "clean" and commit offenses through other individuals. This is the
approach that General Palparan may have taken in the Philippines, where
some of Palparan's officers were trained by U.S. forces at the same time his
unit was committing extra-judicial killings.
To a limited extent, individual embassies have experimented with
expanding the requirements of the Leahy Law. Responsibility for vetting a
unit that receives aid lies with the embassy; for some embassies, any mem-
bership in a suspect unit is an automatic bar to receiving training. 204 In
Indonesia, the U.S. embassy barred individuals from training if they were
ever members of a unit that was accused of human rights violations. 205
Unfortunately, this interpretation has been limited in its application. 206
Even if a blanket ban were enforced, if the unit defined is a battalion, it
would not limit the ability of a division commander such as Palparan to
commit human rights violations with U.S. funds.
The third factor, the overall difficulty of tracking aid, is more of a bar
to the enforceability of the Leahy Law than a weakness in the legislation.
Once a country receives FMF financing, the DOD does not track unclassi-
fied information on how that country distributes the financing.207 All that
is available from the public reports is the line-item funding disburse-
ment.20 If a non-governmental agent wished to track how a country
spends FMF aid, it has to track it through the recipient country's public
documents.209 If the recipient country chose not to disclose how it spent
the money and on which unit, there is no mechanism to keep the public
informed of how U.S. military aid is being spent.
Unfortunately, the experience in Colombia, where INCLE funding was
monitored for end-use compliance, suggests that publication of end-use
monitoring information would not stop human rights violations. In
Colombia, units that received publicized INCLE aid still committed human
rights violations.210 While it would be an invaluable tool in enforcing the
Leahy Law, the availability of information is moot because few parties have
standing to sue in U.S. courts.
204. See Comer, supra note 65, at 62.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See Letter from Paul J. Jacobsmeyer, Chief, Office of Freedom of Info., Dep't of
Def., to Nathanael Miller, Cornell International Law Journal, (Nov. 15, 2011) (on file
with author).
208. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 20.
209. See generally id.; Jacobsmeyer, supra note 207.
210. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INL END USE MONITORING (EUM) REPORT 161
(2007), and BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT OF
STATE, PROGRAM AND BUDGET GUIDE, FISCAL YEAR 2011 19 (2011), with FELLOWSHIP OF
RECONCILIATION, supra note 170, at 7 (demonstrating mobile brigades received consider-
able continuing assistance despite being accused of human rights violations).
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The last factor goes to the heart of the failure of the Leahy Law: arms
and training are fungible commodities. One M4 carbine can be replaced
with another M4 carbine. Even if a country spends $5 million of FMF dis-
bursement on a unit that has never committed a human rights violation,
there is no mechanism to prevent the recipient country from spending $5
million of its domestic budget on a unit that has committed human rights
abuses. The same principle applies to training. In all likelihood, the
officers and men trained by the U.S. military will subsequently instruct
their comrades who were barred from receiving the training firsthand. It is
near impossible for the United States to prevent the soldiers it trains from
sharing their expertise with those who have committed human rights
violations.
VII. Contextualizing the Failure
In a 1988 article, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign
Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, Harold Koh, now the Legal Advisor
of the State Department, placed the blame for the Iran-Contra scandal on
"misguided people violating ineffective laws."2 11 That is precisely the
problem presented by the failure of the Leahy Law. A closer look at Koh's
analysis suggests that, even though there have been four Presidential
administrations, two of which have placed Koh in positions of considerable
influence, 212 little has changed since Iran-Contra illustrated the ability of
the Executive to overwhelm the Legislature on issues of foreign policy.
During the 1980s, the United States sold arms to Iran in order to sup-
port the right-wing Nicaraguan military organization, the Contras. 213 This
directly violated the Boland Amendments, legislation attached to appropri-
ation bills that read:
No funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of
Defense or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelli-
gence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which
would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization,
movement or individual. 2 14
Koh argued that the scandal was the latest in a series of pushes by the
Executive against congressional attempts to check presidential power. 2 15
The pattern is clearest when Koh discussed the War Powers Resolution.2 16
211. Koh, supra note 17.
212. See Biography: Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. DeP'T OF STATE, http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/143262.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
213. See Charlie Savage, In Memoir, Cheney Addresses Controversies, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/08/26/us/politics/201108
26_CHENEYMEMOIR.html; see also Koh, supra note 17, at 1267.
214. Iran-Contra Hearings; Text of Key Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 1987), http://
www.nytimes.com/1987/07/16/world/iran-contra-hearings-text-of-key-
amendment.html.
215. See Koh, supra note 17.
216. See id. at 1259-61.
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Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973 in reaction to the Viet-
nam War and the Johnson Administration using the Tonkin Gulf Resolu-
tion as a broad congressional authorization for dramatically escalating the
conflict.2 1 7 This statute required the President to consult with Congress,
and prevented the President from deploying troops for more than sixty days
without express congressional authorization. 218 In his article, Koh
detailed a series of covert and overt military operations that the War Pow-
ers Resolution had failed to prevent, including "even the creeping escala-
tion it was expressly designed to control."112 9
Over the two-and-half decades following the enactment of the War
Powers Resolution, the Executive has consistently pushed back against
such legislative control. Most recently, members of Congress on both ends
of the political spectrum challenged the Obama Administration's interven-
tion in the Libyan Civil War.220 In June 2011, ten lawmakers, led by Rep.
Dennis Kucinich and Rep. Walter Jones, filed a lawsuit asking a judge to
withdraw from Libya. 221 Four months after the suit was filed, a federal
judge dismissed the case.22 2
In the Libya debate, Koh, the State Department legal advisor, found
himself on the other side of the discussion. In defense of the Obama
Administration, Koh argued that U.S. forces were not engaged in "hostili-
ties" in Libya.2 23 Instead, the United States was in a support role, despite
the conflict costing the DOD roughly $1.1 billion dollars and U.S. drones
periodically firing missiles at Libyan targets.224
The reluctance of the Obama Administration to seek congressional
approval of a Libyan intervention tracks with the reluctance of the Execu-
tive to fully implement the Leahy Law. In both instances, the Executive has
sought primacy at the expense of congressional decision-making in foreign
policy. This explains how Koh can be critical of executive overreach in his
article but defend the Administration's actions when he is operating as an
advisor to the Secretary of State. While not to excuse any of the very real
damage illegal wars wreak on society, viewed through the lens of his own
article, Koh's actions make perfect sense.
Koh describes two complementary views of how foreign policy deci-
sions should be made. One is a normative view expressed in the National
Security Act of 1947 and post-Vietnam era statutes.225 The other is a con-
217. See id. at 1259.
218. See id. at 1260.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing U.S.
Role in Libya Operation, N.Y. TIMES Uune 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/
16/us/politics/16powers.html.
221. See id.
222. See Kucinich v. Obama, No. 11-1096, 2011 WL 5005303 at *12 (D.D.C., Oct. 20,
2011).
223. See Savage & Landler, supra note 220.
224. See Jessica Rettig, End of NATO's Libya Intervention Means Financial Relief for
Allies, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP. (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/news/arti-
cles/2011/10/31/end-of-natos-libya-intervention-means-financial-relief-for-allies.
225. See Koh, supra note 17, at 1279-80.
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stitutional vision guided by Justice Robert Jackson's seminal concurrence
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.226
The normative vision describes an Executive as the center of the sys-
tem controlling all of "American governmental decisions regarding
warmaking, intelligence, covert operations, military sales, and military
aid."2 2 7 The National Security Act of 1947 created a system of manage-
ment of military policy centralized in the presidency.2 2 8 The Act never
mentioned courts or Congress as actors in foreign policy decision-mak-
ing.2 29 Instead, it took subsequent post-Vietnam legislation to envision a
broad basis for congressional coordination with the Executive. 2 30 In addi-
tion to the War Powers Resolution, Congress has enacted a series of resolu-
tions authorizing military force, including the Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002231 and the Authorization
for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists. 2 32
While this view envisions a decision-making role for Congress, Justice
Jackson's view, instead of being solely concerned with efficient policy-mak-
ing, turns attention to the constitutionality of the Executive's action.23 3 He
lays out a three-tier structure for Congress' role in presidential action:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization
of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he pos-
sesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circum-
stances, and in these only, may he be said . . . to personify the federal
sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it
usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks
power ....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsi-
bility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imper-
atives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers
of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential con-
226. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
227. See Koh, supra note 17, at 1280.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 1281.
230. See id.
231. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002).
232. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
233. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (ack-
son, J., concurring).
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trol in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the
subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive
must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium
established by our constitutional system.2 34
Justice Jackson based his view on executive practices that Congress
has recognized as appropriate, legislation that has created a framework for
government decision-making, and judicial decisions. 23 5 In addition to
mandating a constitutional role for Congress in foreign policy decision-
making, Justice Jackson provided a strong role for the Judiciary in policing
the constitutionality of executive decision-making. 2 36
Taken together, both the normative and constitutional views for for-
eign policy decision-making describe several mechanisms through which
Congress and the Judiciary have an active role in policing presidential
action.23 7 Congress can pass laws prohibiting executive practices, and the
Judiciary can mandate that those laws be enforced.2 3 8
Yet, in reality, any role for the Legislature and the Judiciary has been
eviscerated.2 39 The reasons for the Leahy Law's failure to achieve its man-
date are similar to what Koh described when he discussed Iran-Contra:
executive initiative, congressional acquiesce, and judicial tolerance. 240
Even if Congress enacts legislation prescribing foreign policy, actors within
the Executive covertly and overtly push for greater control. In the case of
the Leahy Law, the legislation itself is too weak to survive the pushback.
And since the Judiciary has enacted a series of barriers to the enforcement
of foreign policy legislation, even if the legislation were stronger, congres-
sional decision-making is ineffectual.
In focusing on Congress' failure to pass legislation empowering the
Legislature and the structural weaknesses of the current system,24 1 Koh
understates another explanation for Congressional weakness: the Members
of Congress themselves. The views and policies of former Vice-President
Richard Cheney are emblematic of executive initiative and the rejection of
any role for the Judiciary and Congress within foreign policy decision-mak-
ing. But Cheney pursued his vision of the Executive well before he became
Vice-President. During the Iran-Contra scandal, Cheney was the highest-
ranking House Republican on the congressional committee created to
investigate the affair. 24 2 During the hearings, Cheney defended the Reagan
Administration and in his memoir, Cheney said that he "thought it was. . .
crucial to defend the presidency itself against congressional attempts to
encroach on its power."24 3
234. Id. at 636-38.
235. See Koh, supra note 17, at 1284.
236. See id. at 1285.
237. See id. at 1287.
238. See id.
239. See id. at 1288.
240. See id. at 1258.
241. See id. at 1326-35.
242. See Savage, supra note 213.
243. Id.
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Some of the Congressional reluctance to enforce its own power was on
display when Congress voted on the use military force in Libya. When a
House resolution to support the military intervention came to a vote, it was
defeated 295 to 123.244 However, a House bill to prohibit money for mili-
tary operations outside of support activities was also defeated 238 to
180.245 The Senate failed to vote on either measure, instead postponing
the discussion to debate the U.S. debt ceiling.246 Even with Congress' con-
stitutional ability to limit appropriations 247 and unequivocal support from
the Speaker of the House John Boehner, Members of Congress were largely
content with a symbolic revocation of support.24 8 This reluctance to flex
their institutional muscle could be another barrier in the successful appli-
cation of the Leahy Law.
VIII. Judicial Barriers to Enforcement
In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has made it virtually
impossible for anyone to sue to enforce the Leahy Law. Any challenge to
the Leahy Law is likely to fail because of sovereign immunity,249 because
enforcement is a political question, 250 or because any conceivable plaintiffs
would lack standing.251
Iran-Contra presents a good indication of what would happen if for-
eign citizens tried challenging the Leahy Law. In Sanchez-Espinoza v. Rea-
gan, when twelve citizens of Nicaragua sued for redress of injuries to
themselves by the Contras, then-Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia barred the
complaint on sovereign immunity grounds. 252 Scalia said:
It would make a mockery of the doctrine of sovereign immunity if federal
courts were authorized to sanction or enjoin, by judgments nominally
against present or former Executive officers, actions that are, concededly and
as a jurisdictional necessity, official actions of the United States. Such judg-
ments would necessarily "interfere with the public administration," or
"restrain the government from acting, or ... compel it to act." These conse-
quences are tolerated when the officer's action is unauthorized because con-
trary to statutory or constitutional prescription, but we think that exception
244. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, House Spurns Obama on Libya, but Does Not Cut
Funds, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/us/politics/
25powers.html.
245. See id.
246. See Senate Postpones Libya Vote Amid Budget Dispute, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 5,
2011, 5:03 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43644092/ns/politics-capitol_hill/t/
senate-postpones-libya-vote-amid-budget-dispute/#.T2fFS47w82k.
247. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
248. See Steinhauer, supra note 244.
249. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
250. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d
559, 575 (2d Cir. 2009).
251. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1974); U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-180
(1974); Kucinich v. Obama, No. 11-1096, 2011 WL 5005303 at *8 (D.D.C., Oct. 20,
2011).
252. See Sanchez, 770 F.2d at 207.
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can have no application when the basis for jurisdiction requires action
authorized by the sovereign as opposed to private wrongdoing....
. . . The support for military operations that we are asked to terminate
has, if the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true, received the
attention and approval of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Director of the CIA, and involves the conduct of our
diplomatic relations with at least four foreign states .... 253
More recently, in Arar v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit said that it "has recog-
nized 'the generally accepted view that foreign policy was the province and
responsibility of the Executive .... Thus, unless Congress specifically has
provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude
upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security
affairs.'"254
Moreover, in Goldwater v. Carter, the Supreme Court ruled that the
authority to terminate treaties is a political question and therefore non-
justiciable.2 5 5 In his concurrence, Justice Powell said "[tihe Judicial
Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between
the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitu-
tional impasse."2 56 While there have been systemic flaws that lead to the
lack of enforcement of the Leahy Law, given the deference to the Executive
on matters of foreign policy, it is highly unlikely to lead to a constitutional
impasse.
Nor do Members of Congress have standing to sue. In Raines v. Byrd,
the Supreme Court denied Members of Congress the ability to challenge
laws based upon a diminution of congressional power.2 5 7 The Court said
that, "appellees have alleged no injury to themselves as individuals, the
institutional injury they allege is wholly abstract and widely dispersed, and
their attempt to litigate this dispute at this time and in this form is contrary
to historical experience."2 5 8
With respect to the Leahy Law itself, a District Court gave two reasons
in denying Representative Kucinich's suit to stop U.S. military action in
Libya that cut against any congressional suits to enforce the Leahy Law.
The first was the ability of the legislators to seek a legislative remedy,25 9
and the second was congressional action,2 60 in this case voting against de-
funding the Libyan intervention. Since a legislative remedy to a lack of
enforcement of the Leahy Law is theoretically available and there have been
successive appropriations bills passed that have had the effect of funding
253. Id. at 207-08 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
254. Arar, 585 F.3d at 575 (quoting Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529-30
(1988)).
255. See Carter, 444 U.S. at 996.
256. Id. at 996 (Powell, J., concurring).
257. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829830 (1997).
258. Id. at 829.
259. See Kucinich v. Obama, No. 11-1096, 2011 WL 5005303 at *7 (D.D.C., Oct. 20,
2011).
260. See id., at *8.
693
Cornell International Law Journal
the military units at issue, it is highly unlikely that a suit brought by Mem-
bers of Congress will survive a challenge.
Due to the difficulty in tracking FMF to a particular unit, and therefore
the impossibility of demonstrating that the U.S. arms and training were the
cause of a specific injury, it is similarly unlikely that other groups of plain-
tiffs will have standing to sue. The Supreme Court ruled, in Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, that unless a citizen has been person-
ally injured "standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest ...
which is held in common by all members of the public, because of the
necessarily abstract nature of the injury all citizens share."261 Further, in
United States v. Richardson, the Supreme Court ruled that taxpayers did not
have standing to sue because "to invoke judicial power the claimant must
have a 'personal stake in the outcome,' or a 'particular, concrete injury,' or
'a direct injury,' in short, something more than 'generalized griev-
ances."' 262 However, the possibility of any plaintiff meeting these require-
ments is de minimis.
Due to sovereign immunity and the political question and standing
doctrines, the Judiciary cannot check presidential violations of the Leahy
Law. Without Congress clearly articulating a cause of action, the courts
will continue to bar any potential plaintiffs from seeking a judicial remedy.
It is up to Congress, not the courts, to give strength to the Leahy Law.
Conclusion
Foreign Military Financing is an important foreign policy tool. It pro-
vides military strength to allies and gives the United States additional lever-
age in dealing with foreign governments. Similarly, training soldiers of
other nations provides significant benefits to the United States. Such train-
ing sharpens the military capacity of allies and improves relationships
between U.S. and foreign troops. If coupled with effective human rights
training, U.S. support is likely to prevent some human rights abuses.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how U.S. aid and training has
helped curtail human rights abuses committed by the militaries receiving
the funds. Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Colombia are just three exam-
ples of nations that receive enormous sums in military aid but disburse
these sums in ways that may aggravate, rather than prevent, human rights
abuses. Sometimes, as with the Afghan Local Police in Afghanistan and the
paramilitaries in Colombia, those abuses border on state policy. At other
times, including the extrajudicial killings in the Philippines, the human
rights abuses are compounded by a systemic failure to prosecute the
perpetrators.
The United States often claims to be a beacon of freedom and demo-
cratic government.263 Much of its moral legitimacy in foreign affairs is
261. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220 (1974).
262. U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974) (internal citations omitted).
263. See generally Democracy & Human Rights, THE WHITE HouSE, http://www.white
house.gov/issues/foreign-policy/presidents-speech-cairo-a-new-beginning/democracy-
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based upon its efforts to ensure freedom and democracy around the world.
When its allies are found to commit human rights violations-with the
acquiescence or encouragement of U.S. officials-it undermines this moral
legitimacy. And, where the human rights violations are enabled even in
part by U.S. funding and training, the United States limits its own access to
the moral high ground.
The Leahy Law is an attempt to enhance U.S. moral legitimacy in for-
eign affairs. As the law stands, however, it does a poor job. Without con-
siderable changes in the language of the legislation, the Leahy Law will still
be vulnerable to executive pushback against congressional influence. Since
history suggests that pushback is inevitable, it is up to Congress to create a
stronger law.
One way for Congress to strengthen the Leahy Law would be to make
larger segments of the recipient military ineligible for military aid. While
this would deprive the Executive of some operational flexibility, it sends a
much stronger message in favor of human rights. To deny a recipient coun-
try all military aid would greatly improve the deterrence effect of the Leahy
Law. It would also effectively counter the problem of arms being a fungible
commodity. Even if the law were to define unit at the division or corps
level, it would more effectively secure compliance with human rights
norms.
Congress should also eliminate the disparity in language between the
Defense and Foreign Aid Appropriations Bills. Without violating the Leahy
Law, the Executive can arm questionable units if Congress approves the
funding under the Defense Appropriations Bill. If the law is not changed,
the United States will continue to claim that it cannot arm those who have
committed human rights violations while doing just that.
The Judiciary needs a defined role in enforcing the Leahy Law, and
without congressional action this is impossible. Given the courts' reluc-
tance to become involved in foreign affairs, Congress should clearly articu-
late the boundaries of any potential cause of action. If those who have
been victimized by units receiving U.S. funding can sue in federal court, it
is much less likely that units will commit human rights violations or that
the Executive will fund units that could commit human rights violations.
Involving the Judiciary does raise the potential for a defendant to force
either the United States or the recipient government to disclose damaging
secrets in court. However, narrowing the scope of inquiry could alleviate
concerns with graymail: did the United States provide funding to a unit
that committed a human rights violation? Either an injunction or a verdict
with damages attached would substantially disincentivize funding units
that could conceivably commit human rights violations.
Lastly, foreign military financing should be more transparent. In addi-
tion to seeing which country receives funding, the public should see how
and on whom that money is spent. End-use monitoring should be required
human-rights (last visited July 18, 2012) (discussing U.S. commitment to "advancing
governments that reflect the will of the people").
695
696 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 45
and publicized. After all, if the goal of the legislation is to prevent U.S. tax
dollars from funding those who commit human rights violations, U.S. tax-
payers should be able to see that the objective is accomplished. And if the
goal of the Leahy Law is to show the world that the United States pays
more than lip services to human rights, the world should be able to see that
the United States is willing to stand by that commitment.
The Leahy Law is a well-intentioned piece of legislation that could be
drastically improved. Instead of being the latest casualty in the long-run-
ning dispute between the Executive and Congress in foreign policy deci-
sion-making, or a sop to the consciences of concerned citizens, it should be
strengthened and enforced. It could be an important tool to enforce
human rights, direct congressional influence in foreign policy, and
increase U.S. moral legitimacy. And it might save a few lives.
